ELECTION PROSPECTS FOR HUNGARY
(c) Copyright by István Hegedüs
Thank you for the invitation and for the possibility to give this lecture at the Hungarian Institute of Rutgers University about the recent political development in Hungary. This is not an easy task for me to speak before this audience. The Hungarians around the table might know a lot about the political life at home. For them, some information will be not new. The second problem I face today that I do not want to be too theoretical. However, I would not like to talk only about political gossips. So, I will try to remain somewhere in-between, that means, I will also raise some issues which are relevant in political science concerning political parties.
I will start with a theoretical question: whether the left-right political scale is still a relevant framework for analysis? Then, I would like to speak about the Hungarian political map, including the dilemma whether we have too many political parties or not, and, examining their chances at the forthcoming elections in May, 1998. I am going to analyze the most important political issues which are important in our election campaign. Since I think I will not be able to answer my first question completely at the beginning of this lecture I will come back to it by raising another question: do elections matter at all? Speaking about the first issue, there are some very convincing arguments that the left-right political scale, as a framework for analysis, is not valid anymore. In Hungary, like a lot of their colleagues abroad, some scholars argue that all political processes which started two-hundred years ago with the French Revolution, the dividing line between left and right is over. So, we need a new language and a totally new approach: political parties of our times have nothing to do with old-fashioned ideologies. These are pragmatic political blocks, just look at Tony Blair or Bill Clinton very recently - this pragmatism is what they represent is the only way to get to power in a modern society. Catch-all parties, with pragmatic leaders: that is the future, even if newspapers go on with the old expressions, who is right and who is left, but this differentiation is a mistake. Moreover, liberal democracies have no more real alternatives, socialism-communism as well as fascism are all dead, all over in the United States, Western Europe and recently in Central and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, one might still argue against this perception, saying that this political philosophical view cannot explain the symbolic importance and continuity of left-right cleavages. According to the counter-argument, political parties still represent the old ideological values. Political parties on the left use a totally different rhetoric and system of symbols compared to the parties on the right. The ideological continuity of the left and right wing parties means, for example, that when a left wing political party has to accept a strict economic policy in a bad economic situation, like the governing socialists who implemented a stabilization package recently in Hungary, these left wing parties do it with a rhetoric which emphasizes: this is a must, we must do this policy because of the circumstances, but this policy is eventually against our principles. They are not proud of it or they consider rigid monetarian policies as a transitional solution. A right wing party, on the other side, would argue in a different way. A traditional conservative-liberal party, liberal in economic terms, would go on with a stabilization policy with more proud: for them, market oriented economic reforms are necessary for the future prosperity of the country. But they would be very reluctant to build the welfare system, or if they do so, they would explain it, again, as a must, as a consequence of a social pressure and as a transitional measure. Hence, this counter-argument claims that it is not enough to realize that socialist parties often implement liberal economic measures, like it happened in Spain, but they do it with a very different rhetoric compared to right wing parties. Moreover, if we consider other traditional political issues, not only economic policies and redistribution, there are many issues where we still have traditional social and political cleavages. Religion, abortion, ethnic and race issues, nationalism, anti-communist sentiments, human rights, family: all these issues create to a cultural-ideological gap which still exists between the right and the left in our societies presently. However, there is a strong argument which strengthens the position of those who insist that this framework does not work nowadays, saying that the right-left political scale is and has always been a simplification. And now, when we have very new social problems and issues at the end of the twentieth century, like environmental and other post-materialist challenges, political activism has nothing to do with old dividing lines. But again, we can still argue that left-right political scale still has a lot of sense. Even if it is a simplification, as it has always been a reductionist method in modern societies in order to explain many different political differences with the help of one political dichotomy, the left-right categories are good enough to describe main political disagreements even today. Most environmentalists, like the greens in Europe, might be easily fit in, even if it is a simplification, to the left side of the political scale, when we take their attitudes against the capitalist world economy also into consideration. Political scientists did the same simplification when they assumed that political parties which represented the rural population in the political arena were supposed to belong to the right side of the political spectrum, earlier. Nevertheless, we have to confront a new dilemma: is the heavily debated left-right political scale an appropriate method to understand the development of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe? Here, parties do not have a continuous tradition in consequences of forty or even more years of communist rule. It was not easy to rebuild the links with their past for the historic political forces in these countries, and, moreover, there are many new, often successful political formations without any tradition. On the other side, many of these groups have used old-fashioned ideological terms, a lot of political parties have become nationalistic, not to talk about the post-communist parties, which, evidently, have had strong ideological roots in the past. So, from the point of view of the voters it was very easy to identify themselves with left and right wing political parties. In these countries, the role of ideology in the orientation of citizens has become even more important compared to more established Western democracies, where pragmatism emerged recently.
I turn now to my next points before trying to get to conclusions too early concerning the first issue. Most of the typical Americans, we do not have them here at the table, would ask us after realizing that there are so many political parties in the European countries, whether we really need more than two of them. The answer shows a paradox situation: in Hungary, for example, we have six-seven parliamentarian parties, but many Hungarian would argue that there is no party which they would consider of their own. The American experiences and tradition cannot be transformed to Europe: the number of parties do not matter at all. What matters, is the evaluation of political institutions and political party leaders. Political parties have lost a lot of their appraisal after the regime-change in Hungary. In spite of this decreasing trust in political institutions, the turn-out at general elections is over sixty percent. Although political apathy has seemed to be growing in Hungary, we expect the same turn-out in May, again.
This usual turn-out is very likely to happen again. The recent polls, from the beginning of February, show a clear advantage of the governing ex-communist socialist party in popular support before its rivals. You all know that there is a coalition government since the 94 elections in Hungary. Although socialists have gained an absolute majority with 33 percent of the votes in consequence of our combined electoral system, the liberal free democrats joined the government as a junior partner. Now socialists might have an absolute majority alone, again, whilst free democrats might lose half of their votes on the party-list, from almost twenty percent back to eight percent. The most popular opposition party is Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party with 25 percent. The smallholders, lead by Jozsef Torgyan, would receive fifteen percent of the votes if we had elections next Sunday. They became very popular right after the elections, but slipped down gradually since then. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, which was the leading force of the conservative government between 1990 and 1994, runs in an election coalition with Fidesz. Right wing intellectuals always complain about the division lines of the opposition: this election might help to clean the picture and to push party leaders to a Polish-type cooperation. However, it is hard to imagine, how Fidesz president Orban and Torgyan would accept anybody else as the number one leader of the conservatives except his own person. There are more parties in the opposition, some of them will not get into the Parliament again, since they will not be able to reach the five percent threshold at the elections. The Hungarian Democratic Peoples Party is a small moderate group in opposition, many former ministers of the government of Jozsef Antall who joined this parliamentarian faction after they split from the Forum in 1996. But they were not able to move up from one percent of support and have very little chance to be part of the new legislative, just like the christian democrats, who also went through a destroying internal rupture. Many members of their parliamentarian faction joined Fidesz - this development convinces even foreign observers that liberal young democrats have become pretty conservative.
A year after the last elections, when a strict economic policy, the so-called Bokros-package was implemented in Hungary, there was a very different mood in Hungary. In 1995-96, a united opposition would have received two-third of the votes. Today, however, the socialists seem to be he winners again. Why did they become popular? Well, the answer is probably not in their good performance, but in the rhetoric and in the political messages of the opposition. Again, ideology matters: most political parties of the opposition, including Fidesz, have used a radical political right wing rhetoric which successfully convinced traditional conservative voters but probably frightened citizens on the middle of the political spectrum or voters resistible against rough right wing messages. As soon as they have forgotten the shock of the austerity policy, they simply went back to the well-known socialists as supporters. Government politicians successfully speak about what they call the lack of alternative. It is true, that in 1998, unlike the situation at the two earlier general elections, negative campaign might be not enough for parties in opposition and the lack of clear positive ideas might decrease their chances.
I have to talk about the free democrats, too, who might become the big losers of the elections in May. We have to go back in 1994, when it was an open question whether they would join the socialists to create a coalition, although, the ex-communists did have an absolute majority alone. Finally, they decided to govern together with a much bigger partner, but the four year experiences in power and the recent polls show how much this decision had proved to be a serious mistake. It would be an exciting analysis how free democrats have lost their political weight, their own face and independence in the coalition, being unable to cope with the problem which emerged again and again: whether they should stay or leave government. They gradually gave up elaborating their special liberal political statements and messages and were not able to use their positions for implementing clear liberal policies or bills. We would need more time to go on into details. Now, it is enough to point out that the Hungarian political map will change by May 1998: the liberal center will become much weaker.
Let me continue with the political issues which seem to be important in the campaigns of our political parties. This might help us to understand the political dynamics of Hungarian political changes in the last decade, too. The economic policy of the government, which is the most important aspect of its performance, seems to be very successive, recently. However, improving macrofigures do not matter in the eyes of most of the citizens since they do not feel changes in their private lives, at all. Still, in a new economic climate to criticize the government is not enough: opposition parties might get into a bidding war, arguing that even bigger economic growth is possible. Recently, Viktor Orban spoke about a seven percent sustainable economic growth for twenty years - with this speed we could catch up with the level of the Western European countries. Number two issue of the campaign, which is more advantageous for the opposition parties is crime. Crime rates have grown and there were some brutal killings which shocked the society. A well-known businessman, the owner of many influential newspapers was killed on the street some weeks ago. We do not even know why he was killed: because of his media realm or since he might have been involved in other businesses in the dark economy. Corruption is a linked issue to crime, however, scandals of the privatization process show the responsibility of the government more definitely. The attacks of the opposition on the so-called Tocsik-affair might become a powerful weapon during the campaign.
The next political issue might be the communist past. Nevertheless, as in many other post-communist democracies, it was not a good political tactic to attack the socialists focusing on their roots in 1994. The unpopular conservative governing coalition which ruled the country between 1990 and 1994 used the anti-communist card very often and its radical right wing rhetoric was even more hysteric. This one reason why people did not care much about the communist past - beside other psychological and economic factors. Still, in order to mobilize traditional right wing voters, parties of the opposition will bring this issue into the campaign. Governing free democrats are not in the position to represent a more sophisticated, less emotional, but relevant human rights oriented platform concerning the former heritage of their coalition partner. Although they were very anti-communist in 1989, and free democrats are the major successors of former dissidents, they lost their anti-communist rhetoric in the early nineties when ideological-cultural gap has been growing between them and the conservative political forces. A new, or better to say, a reemerged political issue of the campaign is an environmental one. As you know, the government, actually the socialists alone, have decided to build a new dam on the Danube after the decision of the International Court at the Hague in a trial between Hungary and Slovakia. All other parties, including the free democrats are opposing this plan and the new framework agreement between the Meciar and the Gyula Horn cabinets. Nevertheless, environmental issued have never been very important in Hungarian politics. In 1988-1989, the demonstrations against the dams at Bos and at Nagymaros with a power plant became significant symbolic events when citizens could express their sentiments against the communist one-party system. Now this issue is probably a more technocratic one and the public does not care so much as it did ten years ago at the beginning of the regime-change. The effectiveness of an opposition campaign against the socialists might have its limits, moreover, Gyula Horn stepped back and decided not sign the agreement before the elections. It means that there is no new binding international contract between the countries, yet. In most established democracies, first of all in the United States, the scale of the budget and the state spending on different social fields are the major topics of a political campaign. That is not the situation in Hungary. The debates about the budget do not mean too much for the citizens. It is still the lack of economic knowledge which is the explanation of this phenomenon: most voters do not realize that the main resource of the central budget is coming from their taxes and it is the responsibility of the government how this income will be spent. We cannot expect an America-type of debate when candidates speak about their plans how they want to use the money of the taxpayers. There is another important issue which was in the focus of many political parties but lost its relevance recently, unfortunately: the field of human rights. Since liberal free democrats as a governing party were not able to put these issues on the political agenda in the last four years, it would be too late for them to concentrate on these topics in the campaign. They also fear that raising human rights issues, especially the roma - gypsy - question would decrease their chances at the elections. Nevertheless, free democrats might face the problem that only the very liberal core of the voters will choose them in May anyhow, although they do not speak about human rights... For the socialists and the right wing parties, this issue is much less important. Better to say, there are some illiberal political messages elaborated by prime minister Gyula Horn regarding foreign criminals or gypsy unemployment. These statements do not target civil right activists... Foreign policy issues might be important for the coalition: the accelerated process of our accession to NATO and the start of negotiations with the representatives of the European Union at the very end of March might be emphasized as the results of the politics of the government. However, there is a general consent about the main orientation and priorities of our international relations among the political parties. But in details, it is not true anymore: opposition parties argue that Hungarian national interests should be better represented when talks start with the European Union and the rights of the Hungarian minorities abroad should be protected and represented much harder by the government. Although right wing parties have supported NATO-enlargement, their rhetoric was very different from the enthusiasm of the government before the referendum in November 1997. Viktor Orban, for example, said that the western world had never come to help us during our twentieth century history, like in 1956, moreover, they had been responsible for the piece treaty in Trianon where we had lost two-third of Hungarian territories. Since there is no alternative, we should join NATO, the strongest military and economic alliance of states, although, in-between, people might grid their teeth because of former injustice.
I would like to emphasize again, that in 1990 and 1994 most people voted against the incumbents. We cannot feel this general protest mood of the population this time. New political issues, positive campaign messages might become more important, since we cannot say that socialists are generally popular, either. Opposition parties, which might use a pragmatic political language and emphasize their positive alternative solutions without losing their ideologically stricter basis would have real chances to win in May. But right wing political parties seem to be unable to pursue this strategy - even Fidesz became too radical and too ideological for many voters in the middle of the spectrum. Probably, they did not realize this change in our political life: negative campaign of the opposition might be not enough for a victory at this election. Voters might also consider why they should vote for the opposition - those who do not identify themselves ideologically as supporters of the right wing parties might not be automatically convinced by these forces.
For them, the question is the same like for us here: do elections matter at all? It is partly true that whatever parties get to power it would not mean too much difference regarding the economic policy of the government. I think, most of the opposition parties attack market reforms because of tactical reasons. Moreover, international constrains and the transformation process of the economy would not give too much space for a very different economic strategy. But this does not mean that nothing would be different. I remember that foreign observers emphasized the similarities in the economic programs of our parties in 1989, saying that all political groups had the same ideas about the future and want to privatize and to help in shaping a market economy. Well, we know what a huge difference there was in the world-view and the rhetoric as well as in practical policies of the ruling conservative, christian-national political block and of the messages of the liberal and socialist opposition between 1990 and 1994. Since then, ideological tensions and (sub)cultural debates, including the famous media war, among political forces have become less relevant in everyday political behavior. The traditional dividing line between liberal urban intellectuals and a third way national counter-elite lost its importance. Politics and moral are not so intertwined anymore. Nevertheless, it is a crucial question for intellectuals, but also for citizens whether right wing parties, if they get to power, what is unlikely according to the recent polls, would start a new cultural attack against liberalism and the dominant political-cultural post-communist elite or they would cooperate with the state apparatus. It is not the same, whether they would regard the negotiations with the EU as a battlefield or they accept the western logic and culture of a bargaining process between future partners. It matters, whether Hungary builds a new dam on the Danube or a new government finds a more environment-friendly and less expensive solution together with the Slovaks. It is a huge responsibility of the political elites whether they help the roma minority on its road to integration or they let intolerance grow in the population. If free democrats lose a lot of their influence in public life, human rights, liberal values - liberal in European sense, which means an ideological priority of liberty and a centrist political position on the political scale, not a left wing democrat platform as in the US -, all these political issues might disappear from the political agenda. It makes a difference whether the present social-liberal coalition, the socialists alone, Fidesz with the Hungarian Democratic Forum, or an Orban-Torgyan coalition will govern the country. In other words: elections do matter. Now, I would like to go back to my first question, whether right-left political scale is a good framework of analysis, or to put it in another way, whether ideology matters in a modern society or not. I think, this is the art of politics what is necessary to realize here. Tony Blair or Bill Clinton were very clever how they moved to the center of the political scale. However, they have to be very careful not to lose their traditional political supporters on the left side. Too much ideology might result in a too small basis of strong supporters, to much pragmatism might become a danger, if traditional voters start to forget about their parties. That is why Clinton speaks about American values but he also returns to the issue of social security. Politics is neither an ideological zeal nor a technocratic project. Now, it is very unlikely that Gyula Horn, or anybody with a communist past might become a pragmatic and broadly accepted politician. In spite of the good chances of the socialists, our prime minister has a high support only in the one-third of the population, the other two-third of the people dislikes him very much. He is not a centrist political actor. One of the big questions of Hungarian political life is whether Viktor Orban, now successfully conquering the political right, would be able to turn back and become a pragmatic politician, losing his ideological rigidity. This shift would also test positively the theoretical assumption that to link pragmatism and ideology successfully might work in the case of right wing parties, as well...
In order to make political fights in Hungary more plausible and to show how left and right wing ideologies matter practically, let me quote some political statements and messages of our public actors. Leadership, the culture and the methods of politicians, their political identities, beliefs and values - their personalities are relevant characteristics.. Their rhetoric often shows how far they are ready to go in ideological terms - trying to maximize their votes, or, in contrary, losing their control and expressing their often self-destroying real views... Voters might remember the style, the way of thinking and some short but typical statements of politicians much better than their complicated economic programs. For example: Gyula Horn said at a town hall meeting - he is famous about his political improvisations before such an audience - that we do not need so many philosophers. The anti-intellectual message of this statement is clear. I think he forgets in the very moment that such sentences might be read next day in the newspapers by a different public. Jozsef Torgyan spoke two years ago about pseudo-liberal worms, creating a big scandal. Recently, actually, he tries to behave less radically, but for him it was impossible to become a more moderate politician, since he went too far before and he is also supposed to be a political clown by many citizens. Gyula Horn also said attacking the Danube Circle and other environmentalists: they pollute our social environment. One of the problems of our democracy that even the media gave up to come back to such statements after one day - I think in a more traditional democracy most prime ministers would not dare to say anything like that. It is a very typical understatement how free democrats tried to explain their own role in the big privatization scandal, saying that we have been also involved in the case. One of their leaders complained, not openly, but it was leaked, that the socialists make us wash the floor, which sentence shows how much free democrats became schizophrenic about their ambiguous position in the government. Nobody should feel shame because of their past membership in the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, declared Gyula Horn. This is a new approach of the ex-communists: they had much less self-confidence during the early eighties. I think collective guilt does not exist, but this statement does not sound like a self-analysis of mistakes and sins under a system of soft dictatorship rather a proud of former activities in a reform period. I think it would be not easy to express such an almost nostalgic view without rough reactions in any other post-communist countries. Viktor Orban, on the other hand, spoke about an alien-like government, which does not represent Hungarian interests, citing Ferenc Deak, the great Hungarian statesman of the nineteenth century, who, of course, spoke about the Habsburgs. Orban also said that why should we join NATO if there is no more Hungarian soil - land - to be protected. Fidesz, together with the other opposition parties, successfully opposed the liberalization of land ownership in Hungary, but unsuccessfully initiated a referendum on this issue. Gyula Horn said that gypsies should throw out their criminals from themselves, whilst Laszlo Kover, the deputy of Orban spoke about Sunday law protectors, talking about the intellectuals who protested against brutal anti-gypsy housing policy of the Fidesz-led local government in Szekesfehervar, a town sixty kilometers west from Budapest..
And so on. Concluding to the argument again, that ideology and rhetoric matter, I am sure that Hungarian voters, even the uncertain floating citizens, might have a lot of good reasons to decide which party to choose in May, 1998. Thank you for your attention.